Selections

QCT Our limits have compeüed us to abridge i P the report of the following important tlavc u case, as publislied in the Cmcinnati papers, h Wr believe, iiowever, í!at evqry thing 5l rial is relained. s LAW INTELUGENCE. Ouro - July Tkrm, 1843. - Jones } r vs. V Circuit Court of Ihe U. States, s Vanzant. ) 0 This action was brought by the plaintiíT, a jcitizen of Kentucky, ngainst llie defendant, a % cilizen of Ohio; under the Act of Congress in ] regard to fugitives from labor . , The declaration con:ained nine Counts, the j , sabstance of which were that tlie plaintiff ( ing a citizen of Kentucky, where slavery ia established by law, owned nine slaves, who without liis license departed from his service and came to the defendant in Hamilton county. That the above sluves, came to the defendant, who after notice that they were fugilivet, harbored and concealed them, contrary to the statute, that the plaintiff by his agenls then and there undertook to seize and arrest such slaves, as fugitives from labor, but was knowingly and willingly obstructed and hindered by the defendant from so doing, and that the defendanl harbored and concealed Andrew, a fugitive from labor after notice. Witnesses were then examined, who lesti- Red that íhe plaintiíF owned these nine neroeB - that they absconded - that the plaintiff paid 8450 for the recovery of part of them - that his whole expenses amoiinted to $600, and that Andrew, who had Cecaped, was woith $600. Hargrave and Henerman testified that they captured ihe slaves in a waggon of the ilefenuant when he was present, and that defendant acknowledgcd them to be slaves, but said they were bom free, and in conversation with others he repeatedly spoke of them as fugiiive slaves, and said he had done right in assisting them, and would do so again. Plargrave and HefFerman had no authority whatever for seizing the slave?, and they were subsequently indicted for kidnapping. This wasuie Eum of me eviüence, ana a moüon was made by the c'efendnnt's counsel ío overrule the testimony. This motion was argued on both tides at great lengtb. Juclge McLeau, after defining1 cleariy the nature of the moiion, proceeded as follows: The range of discussion by the counsel o both sidee,has not been restricied by the Court. It has embraced slavery in all its forms and consequenees, the federal constitution, the act of Congress aud the power of the States. - It may be proper to notice some of the topics thus discusscd, which have a bearing upon the case under consideration. Tlie nature of Ihe action has been examined. It must be admitted, that it arises wholly under the constitution and act of Congress. - i Slavery is local in its eharacter. It depends upon the municipal law of the State where it is estabhshed. And if a person heul in slavery go beyond the jurisdiction whïre Blavery is not tolerated, he becomes f ree. And this would be the law of these States, had the con - stitution of the United States adopted no regulation upon the subject. Recaption has been named ns a common law remedy. But this remedy could not be pursued beyond tlie sovereignty where slavery exists, and into another jurisdicüon which had entered into no compact to surrender the fuguives. There is no generul principie in the law of nations, which would requiie a surrender in such a case. The remarks of the Supreme Court in regard to a surrender of captured slaves in tlie Amistad case, were made with reference to our treaty wi'h Spain. In our colonial ;overnments and under the confederation, no general provisión existed for the surrender of shves. From our eariiest history it appears that slavery existed in all the colonics, and at the adoption of the federal constitution it was tolerated ia most of the States.The consutution trcaís of claves as person?. The view of Mr. Madison, who "thought t wrong to admit in the constitutie, the den i Uiat thero could be properly in men," secms to have been carried out in that most tant instrument. Whelher slaves are reierreel to n it, as the basis of representación, asniigrating, or being imported, or as fugitives f rom labor, Ihey nro spoken of as persons. Property, real or personal, tukes its designation and character from the law cf the States. To do thÍ3 was not the object of t!ie federal conslitution. It organized a federal governmeot by sccurig cerLain dek-gatotl power?,.)d by itnposing certain restrictions onihe tates. Among these restrictións it ia proded tliat no State shall impair the obligation "a contrae!, nov libérate a person who is held i labor in another State from which he esipes. In this forrn the constitution protects )ntracl8 and the rights of the masler,.but 'A ■ginates neither. The traffic in slaves does not come undér ie constilulional power of Congress to regute commerce among the several States.- - i this view the constitution does not considr slaves as merchandize. Tftis was held in ie case cf Graves v. Slaughter, 15 Peter's. 'he conslitulion no vhere speaks of slaves a3 roperty. But how does th's affect the case nder consideration? It is clear the plaintiil as no common law rig-ht of aclion for tha ijury complained of. He must look excluvely to the constifution and act of Congress r reürois. Tiic counsel for the defendant dmit thai, in a given case, the plaintiff has a :medy under the act of Congress. If this be 5, what have we to do wilh slavery in the bstract. It is admitted by almost all who ave examined the subject, to be founded m ;rong, in oppression, in power against right. Jut in this case, we have only to inquire vhether the acts of the defendant, as proved inder the law of Congres?, subject him to a:laim for indemnity by the plaintiff. Cj the Srd sec. of the act respecting fugi;ives from labor, it s provided, "that when a person held to labor in any of the United State?, 8cc. under the Iaws thereof, shall escape into ary other of the said Staies,the person to whom such labor is due, his agent or altorney may seizc or arrest nny. euch fugitive, k.c. And the 4th section provider, that when cny person shall knowingly and willingly obstruct or hinder such claimant, hia ageut or attorney, in so seizing or arresting. such fugitives from lubor, &cc, ot shall harbor or conceal such person?, after notice that hc or she was a fugitive froin laboras aforesaid, shall for elther of the said offences, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars, fcc., saving moreover to the person cláiming such labor or service, his right of action for or on account of the said injuries, or either of them."" As the fiist clatise in the above section supposes the ofiènder to come in contact wilh the claimant of the fugitives, his agent orney; aiiü as mere is no eviaence snowing an authority from the c'aimant to those who arrested the fugitives, the second clause onlvof the section will be examined. The offence under this clause consisfs in harboring or concealingsuch fugiiive, after notice that he or she had escaped from labor. Wbai acis shall constitute this ofFence? What shall be a notice under the stalute? Thai a formal written notice from the claimanf, his agent or. attorney, ís not required, must be admilted; Nor must the notice, verbal or othenvise, necessarüy come from the claimant or his agent - Such a conslrucüon presupposes a knowledge of the individual who harbors or conceals tlio fugitives. At this etage of the case it is un necessary to say more on this point than there is evidence beforc the jury which conduces to show that the ciefendant knew the negroes in question were fugitives from labor. Whethcr the proof is Bufficient to establislt this fact is a matter fbr the determination of the jury. To harbor or conceal a fugitive o violation of the statute, the act must evince an? intention to elude the vigilance of the masler or his agents; and the act dune must be ealculated to attain this object. To relieve the Imnger of a fugitive would not be vvithin the statute, unless accompunied by acts showing a determination to disregard the law. There is evidence in the case conducing to show an intention by the defendant, and also to show acts calculated to give effect to such nn intention. The sufficiency of this evidenee, Jiice that which regards the notice, will be referred to the jury. The clause m the seclion, "saving to the claimant the ïight of action for the injuries received bevond the penalty, presupposes a right of aclion to e.xist." The correctness of this wiil scarcely be questioncd, when the constitucional provisión on the subject is coasidered. The Court overruled the motïon. Tlie case was argned at great length and with much ability before the jury. After the close of the argument,Judge McLean charged the jury as follows: The attention and patience with which you have heard this case, gentlemen of the jury, show that you uppreciate Hs importance: and I doubt not that in deciding it, you wiH follow the dictates of an unbiassed judgment. The plaintiff does not seek redress for the injuries corhplaincd of, on any general principie, legal or equitable, of ihe eowunon jaw. Ho relies on the constitution and the oct of Congressas the foundation ofhis right. The 2d sec. of the 4:h article of the constitution declares that, 4no person held to service or labor in one stnte,under the Jaws thercof, escaping into nnother, shalJ, in consequence of any law or rpgolation tlierein, bc discharged f rom sucii uervice or labor; but shall be deiivercd op on claim of ihc party to tvhoin such