The Constitution Anti-slavery: For The Signal Of Liberty

Messrs. Editors:- In the closing paragraph of my communication in the Signal of July 15th, my meaning is not expressed. I intended to say that the argument - not the provisions of the Consütution - contained some broad assertions, &c. I proceed with the argument in reply to Mr. Foster's contained in the SignalofJulyl. Mr. F. quotes the lOth article of amendments to show that the Constitution sanctions slavery. It is in these words: - "The powers not delegated to the United State3 by the Constitution, nor prohibiied by it to the States, ore reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." What are legitímate powers? Blackstone, a deservedly eminent expositor of legitímate law, and a standard author, holda the following language: "The law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of superior obligation to all other. No human laws have any validity if contrary to this: and such of them as are valid, derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately, or immediately, from this great original. And those rights which God and Nature have established, are called natural rights, such as life, and liberty, need not the aid of human legislation to make them more eflfectual; - on the equtrary, no human laws have the power to abridge or destroy them, unless the individual shall himself commit some act which amountsto for- feiture." Our Beclaration of Independence, -vhich lies-at the fouhdation of the ConBtitution, embodies these same self-evident truths. If no human legislation can abridge or destroy the pnTamount law of liberty, then no power to créate, continue or sanclion slavery could have been delegated, because no such power exists. If HO such power exists, then no such power was reserved. If no such power was reserved, then the Constitution does not sanction the exercise of such power by any of the States. The common law, in whose language the Constitution is expressed, does not recognize such a power. As respects legitimóte powers, it is a nonentiry, and therefore could not have been delegated or reserved. The lOlh article of amendments, then, is not proslavery. Mr. F. cöntends that the Iégislation by wiiich men are reduced to slavery is the "due procesa" referred to in the 5th art. óf amendments which declares that "no person shall be deprived'of liberty without due process of law " The 6th or next article, uoubtless to guard against sbuse in adjudicating so important matters as those of life and liberty, recites the "process,' making it consist essentially in beitrg infórmed of the nature and cause of the accusation - confronted with witnesses - counsel for defence - and trial by Jury. Are human beings reduced to slavery by such a process? Are they not on the contrary deprived of their liberty by the arbitrary force of a bare naked statulgjwïthout any of tlïis legal pa raphranalia? And yet on this ground is the constitutionality of theslave attempled to be vindicated. This seems to me a Oonfounding of a prescribed processofa law inflicting a penalty for cause, with an arbitrary statute made for the accomplishmentof a purpose.withoüt any cause known ta the criminal code of civiHzed nations. The slavecode transforma men to without accusation; without teitncsses: without counsel: wit hout jury! Is this the "due process" of ih'e Constitution? Can men "be deprived of liberty for any cause which the laws of the land raay assign?" Mr. F. says they can, and founds an argument upon the assumption, with sundry illustrations; but unforunately his argument is foreig.n to his -position; for the south depri ves men of their liberty without 'assigning any cause. In all those cases wheroin may be rightfully deprived of liberty. th'ere is adequate cause; but in the matter of sluvery, there is confessedly no cause. Then tkdr ís fallacy in the argutnant. Mr.F. takes the groünd that the meaning o ccrtain clauses s to be determined by compromise said to have been effected b the i'ramers of the Constitution. Ifthere be any compromise affectin the said i!due process" it must be in th Constitution, else that instrument was no fnirly penned. If not fairly penned there was fraud or omission in the trans action. The fraud would vitiate th clause and consequently render it nugato i-y: if omission, the object sought wa lost, and can be recovered only by amend ment. But the amendment has not been made, and therefore cían be no part of th Conslituiion. But what are we to under stand by the word law? Legitímate o common law is confessedly a stranger t slavery. The constitution is written ii the language of the common law whic includes no idea of slavery in its signifi catión. Therefore the law of slavery i not the law of the Constitution. It fo; lows that any process even, enacted by th slave code, cannot be that of the Consti tution, because it appertains to the slave law which is not the law of the Constitu tion. The due process of the Constitu tion mustbe thatof the constitutional law and not that of its antipode. Now tha these are antipodes isevident,inasmuch as the one deprives men of Liberty by way of punishmeni for crime: while the other deprives them of that boon without the shadow of crime, and inflicts slavery, which, by the Constitution, is not punishment for crime. Shall the Constitution, that grand Chart of our personal, our civil, our religious, our national liberty, still sleep on in dealh, while an alledged, unwritten compromise, cssentially wicked in its inception, and violative in its reseults, of the declared objects and express guarantiesof the Constilution, is suffered to override the immutable principies of natural Jusüce, and the rights which that instrument secures to ALL PERSONS, indicating no distinctions of color or caste; md that too because an illegitimate power which has been aptly denominated "brute force," of which legitimate law takes no cognizance, except for its punishment, is attempted, by proslavery construction, to be foisted into the catalogue of legitimate }Overs and is dignified with the name of av? If a State enact a law protective of nobocracy, it can be of no binding force. 1. Because it conflicts with natural jusice. 2d. Because the Constilutian, con "brmably to natural justice, guarantees irotection to the people from the operadons of brute force. If a State enact slavery, the enactment can be of no bíndng force, because the law of slavery conlicts with natural justice, and because he Cönslitutioti, conformably to natural ustice, secures the people from brute brceby enacting thatno person shall be deprived of liberty except on '■accusationï' alias for the commission of crime: alias 'by due process of law." Let us not be deceived about the word asv. Wrong cannot be made right by spurious legislation: and that must be necessarily spurious, and consequently nugatory, which is intrinsically wrong. - Let base metáis, bearing the stamp and shape of wrong, pass for genuine coin Léi" tlie rnasüed" Ourang Outang pass for a man. But let not a barbarous oppressive code, which tramples under foot all the great principies that shield and protect human rights, be taken as the paramount rille of human action, because the oppréssors cali it law. Let the base coin be submitted tb the test, and the fraud is detected. Let the monkey exerf his orgáns of sound, and he is no Ibnger a man. Let the slave code clutch and appropriate the image of God, and it is no longer legitímate lo.w. If it be not leg-itimate aw, the sanctiorr-of the Constitution can never extend to it, for the language of that' instrument i& that of legitimate law. The position of our govemment is supremely ridiculous. With a Constitution replete with righteous objects aTid sublime and holy principies and salutafry safeguaraVto liberty,' feproceeds, on intangible traéitions, so construe the Constitution as tómake if defeat its-ob-ectsand paralize its although those principies are efficiënt, immütable and eternal in their nature. Suppose that the word slavery were somehow blazonecKn capitals en the face of the Constitution? Would that - a conventional conspjracy- a legal nonentity - overturn its whole structure, annihilatingat once the Hnbeas Corpus and the right to trial by Jury? a rational construction, would not the rights to securfty of and property, the Jury trial, the HabeasCorpus - -the estab lishment of justice, prevail over an ac against the eternal law of justice which no human legislation can destroy? Ido not see why they shotrW not; Müch less do 1 see why they should not prevaitorer and destroy theforce of an unrecorded, impalpable compromise, if indeed, ifhave any to destroy. Some remarks, perhaps on the thrée-fi'fth clause hereafter.