Legal Reform

ju, We have in contemplation llie writtug of 3d a series of articles on eome poinls of L?ga by Reform, gfopwing llie neccFeity nnd practica a bility of a changu in tlie modes of administer mor jusiice. In our retnarks re dmll oim o "I the prHseniation of tl.e sitbject in o plam an( practical maniicr, wiihout following out ab1 struse and intangible speculations, wiihoul being governcd on the one hand by excesivo " I voneration for the coll-cted wisdom cif ages,1 B and wiihout being learj into Uie other extreme , of impracticable nnd disorganizing mdicalism. . The pion wc now have in view vijl] invoive re . morks on the Stnndard of Lmv, on tta Technicalities. its Delayp, iis Expenses, its CouriF, nnd its Practititioners. We commence the subject to-day -ih some observalions on THR STANDAKD OF TUK LAW. Every one knows the distir.ction bet ween Statute and Common Lnw. Tbc first is that wliich ia formally enacted by the authorüy of the Stoie or Nation. It speaks for itseJf, comnianding or forbidding particular things in explicit languogp. But our Courts of Justice ore governed to n far greater extent by Common Law. But the question arises, what is Common Law?- Whence does it derive ha authority, where ' canitbe found, and how can it be certainly ' known? A vast proportion of' our citizens, ' whose lives, fortunes, and Jiberties are ■ mlly subject to its provisions, know little ( ceming ita authority, nature and i ness. I I In answer to onr first interrogatory, the v earned tel] ue that the decisions of previous l Courts of Justice are Commen Law: that c 'the precedente and rules eslnLlished by them must be followed, unless flatly absurd and t] ust:" that the reports of the doings of these :ourts are to be received as evidence of what n s faw; end the correctness of these reports is o be determined by thejtidges of the severa) b( :ourts, who are Ihe living oracles and b( lents of law, in all mattere of doubt. c'This Common Law, then, is contained i iimny thnusand volumes of reporte of th proceedings of Englieh Courts, which hav. been continued in a regular series from tlu ' time of Edward the second - a period offiv 5 hundred and fifty years. For when our fa ' thers dec'ared themeelves independent of Greal Britain, they no more becnme independent ol . her lawa tban they did of her language. Both were spread throngh onr States, and had be. comeas much the property of our fathers. as of the Englieh naticn. Henee these English laws, thus accumtilated throngh so manj ceniuries, are now as binding upon our courts of justice os they are upon the couris of England. But in addition to this, we have also the deci sions of American courts in twenty-six States, which are of equal authonty. Thus whiie all our other instituties have been improved by the spirit of the age, and by increasing light nnd knowledge, the Common Law hae continued stationary, having in itsolf no elements of radical improvement or progresa.- The stnndard, as laid down by its highest authority, 6 to follow the former decisions; and the greatest rational hope of the practitioner would be to add more decisions to the myriada which hnd already accumulated. Our courts of Jaw ore usuaJly called courts of justice. But this is in part a misnomer.- He who carries a case inlo one of these courts is prefiumedto go thcre in quest of jvstice;] that ie, for a rcmedy for a wrong done or apprehended: but he gremly mista kes its char - acter if he expects that his matter of difference wilt be decided according to eqoity.- Mosts of the courts do not even make any pretensión: of this kind. Tiey profes to be anly courts of law: thit they dispense, ivhether it be just or nnj.ist. So much jus■ice as Ihe law contains the cliënt may possi)Iy receive: but he isliable also to receive the nost palpable justice in the shape of Jaw: j 'lor jaw and justice are by no meuns convertible terms. The cliente can only expect to receive legal justice, whch is often o mixture of justice and njustice, and eometimes it practi cally operates as a flagrant wrong. Por although the abstract doctrine isthat law is foundcd in justice, yet the legal eludent is 'aught in his first elementary books, tbat tbere are many decisions which are good law which may be both manifestly absurd and unjust; and "must bo religiously adhered to by the judges;" and Ihat "precedente and rules must be foí lowed, even wlten ihey are ftitly absurd and vnjust, ]f they are agreeable fo ancient princi pies." The jury are not eworn to distribute justice botween the parties wbo appeal to Uiern: not at all: ihey areeworn to render a verdict according to law and the testimony which may be ndduced in court; and they nre to bring in such a verdict, whatever may be thcir opinión of its justice. The jury, indeed, as wel! as the judges, are to do justice es far as the law will permit; but whéh law and jus fee conflict with each other, the law is to become the paramount rule of action. The eamo princi,:le holds good in all criminal cases. But wrong is done to the applicant for justice not only through decisionsof tlie courts. againsf juslice, but through the vncerlainlyl and contrariefy of those decisions. Every one who has ever consuiicd lnwyerS knowsthat law may be found wlijcli favors, or which can beadduced n favor of ony case. Any person who has nioney enongh to pay fjr looking up law can b!way8 have it found for urn among the many thousands of volumes containing it. The decisions being often contradictory, and nearly equally bnianced in poirü ofauthority, tl.ere is in reulity no aciual standard ofJavv in those caees; and the dcci. 'sionaofthejudges and junes are sometimea one way, and eomelimes the other. Now we take it for granted, tl.af the diapensution of justice is Ihe object of havinp I courts. Toe dispensation of law is no vah.c, only so far as the Jaw is agreeable to jusiice. The execution of unjust law is bul ano'hnr '"me for downright tyranny. The object of "old.ng: a court 8 to do j.istice ín thosr partir ufar case, which come befjre u ,, consequence to the public vvhst w. the custnmoflhe court i„ the dark OgC,, prov.dod J-nee be don, betweon contendí partid norc. lusevdent that there must aJso bc eomemWofprocccding „ every courtTliedecisions íliould be as uniform aa possiblf a so fur us I hoy cnn be nmde 60 without dom il inj'istice to Ihe parlies. It wonld, therefore be unwise to dispone entircly with the pres ■ pnt autliurities, nnd leavc courts and juriei t without wiy guide Every litigate d case nuif-t be detcrmiiicd by one of tw - standard - by Law or by Jdstick. One ol t these must nece.-snrily be supreme. They i moj , indeed, ofton ngeeo; but it is fotra'd n!so that they oflen disagree :o agreuter or les ? oxtenf, nnd sometimos are flntly controdictorv. . What sholl be done io these cnsesí The lawyersnndjudgessay, Let Common Law be supreme.' ' And so i1, has nhvays been. But does not common eense require that Jusríce ehould be the presidingf genius of everv íeal tribunal? WJiat is Lavv worth without Justice? But Justice is now become a mpre i underiingr of Law. Oornmon Law has entered the temple of Justice nnd taken hercaptive, and she now fiJls a suboit'inate station by the side of her conqueror, which she iá permitted ! to hold only for I he purpose of addinp f o t,e tiiimph of the superior divinify. VVhen n case comes into court, the opinión of Common Law s supreme, whether Juslice coii.cide in itornot. If it meets hor mind, eheisgracionsly permitfed to coufirm the decisión of Common Law for the purpose of shovvin Ihe intímate harmony that snbsists between i Law and Justice; but when she presumes to i ofier an argument against a tyrannical sion of Common Law, ehe is told lo be silent, and if reluctant 10 obey, she is 1 with gngged and driven uncerenonious!y from t the judges' seat, until she is again wanted to ronfirm nnother decisión of Common Law. t Such is the actual condition of our legal I ribunals. Law, anü not Justice. presides e ver their deliberations, prejeribes the forms, I nd charges and ewears the jury. This state" c 'f things should be reversed. Justice sbould t e made supreme, and Common Law should n e her subordínate Let the case be tlclenrly etated to the court and jury; and lel } Common Law adduce her numerous anthori; ties as heretofore, for the purpose of subserv. ing the ends of Justice. So far as they accompliahed this, they should be considered, opplied,and regarded: so Jar os they were' adverse to this, they ehould be set aside ín this way Commoij Law would be ñúSiliog her iegilhnate province. The accummnlatcd wisdom of ages, would be brought to bear upon every question, through the opinior,s of eminent judies nnd juriste, although ; sincedead; while their accumulaled follies and abturdities would be discarded and nllimaíely droppeci from legal authorities. In this way every thing that is really valuable in the decieions of the common law would be re:ained and improved npon by each successive generation; and in this way only can a door of subsiantial improvement be opened. In all other sciepccs-ror instance, in medicine, in divinity, in astronomy, in chemistry- improvements are constantly mtjkin?. And hov are they made? Not by opposíng all change, and "following the precedents" of eminent seientific mrn who have gone before, but by a conlinual change from error to truth. But how can there be improvemenf where there b no change? And f legal precedents" should be followed for a thousend yearas they now are, how could any substantial improvement take place? Ttappears to us that this is precisel the change which is r.eeded in tbe regulation of , our courrs; and without it, a full and complete reform of the Judiciary syslem ct.nnot be ef fected. Some change which siiall give great er prominence to the claims of justice in the decisión of suits is imperiously needed; and we know of no better than tha( hich, while t discards all that is useless or wrong, will l )ermit the incorporation of whatpver is } ent or voluabie in the acquiipments of l irn limes. I07= A Capt. Flcnvery, of the Spitfire vessel, has been convicted of havingbeer engaged in the African slave trade. Ji is said to be the first conviction ever known under the law of the United States. It was obtaïned in Boston. The counsel for the defendant attributed the condemnation of liis cliënt to the vessel having been sentinto Boston, instead of a southern port. The probability is that the slave trader will be speedily pardoned by Mr. Polk. He can then engage in the domestic Slave Trade, and instead of beingcaptured as a criminal by our naval officers, ihe whole navy will be ordered I out, if necessary, to defend him in trading in the bodies and souls of Atnericans. "They of the South did not care one farthmg- what Ihe Constilution allowed or dis of Vii Mr. Archer doubtlera spenks ihe stntiments ot the southern portion of ihe "true Libertv porty."- Sigi.al of Liberty. Doubtless ihis is a mistake. Mr. Archcr, we believe, has joined the JYaln-es. ir he is corrcctly reported in the speech quoted by heSignal, we would as soon vote for tbe rankest locofoco n the land. Indeed, the sentiment quoted above is of the essence of Locofocoism.- Sale Journal.(EIt is stated that arrangments nre making- fOr layin wires from Albany to Ulica fof a Magnetic Telegraph, and negotiations aro in progresa for a line bctween Boston and Albany. The Marriiall Expoundor expecte Eoon to make announcements like the following: "FoRKiojf NKAvs._Tje Acadia arrived in oston day, at precisely 20 minutes befurr I ocock, P. Af.,nnd we received news of herornval, ihis morning, at 10 minutes bc fore 12. This ioolcá quite nslonishing, bat t is thns explained by the Editor: 'Boston is jsj degrew enat or Marshal!, ?.nd it f.,l!')W8 hat the un risea and seta 54 ininut é íaterm the day. nt n„slon than at ilns place. Now xMorse's Tdegraph commu nscRtea intelJigPnce intat.uieotisly. Two or ihree seconda wou ld serve to conVey the nfnrmation of an arrival, from Boston to Marcha II; and, of courso, we wou ld get t some hlry-jhrec or four minutes eurlier in the day tnan they would in Bosio'f!