Election Of State Officers

It was a principie held llieoreucaiiy by our lathors, that all power belonged lótlu'poo, nnJ omanated f rom them. But t was not tliought wiso to carry out ihc principie n detail by givíng [hem the rlcction oí all public oíficers and íigrnis. In wme instancès it was whlilu-M, and in o'.hers granted. Thus, as has boon well reinarkcd, the people milit vöiö lr o governor direcl4 but not lor Pn-sidi'iU witliout the intorvenlion of electors. Thcy might choose a treasurer the tówn but not for the State or the Nation. In some States, justices niight be chosen wlnle Judges might not. The freenian ot' n village were deemed the proper electors of a Congressman, while their Postmaster was chosen by a power a thousand miles distant. Through the alteratiens in the State Constitutions, these inequalilies have begun to disappear, and all the changes that have been made have tended to invest the people more fully with the;r of appoinimg to oflice. We are told jy the papers that in Mississippi tliis Democratie principie is fully carried out. 'Every oflice is elective from the highjst judicial to the lowest executive; the whole peoplo elccting oflieers whose íunctions embrace the whole State, while local ofiiees ore elected by theïr respective localities." The vast resort of politcal gamblersand intriguers to the capital Df each State and the Nation on the chango of each administration, and the multitude of remováis for political reasons, have excited public attention lo a consideration of these evils. The whigs, if we remember righlly, some years past we re favorably dis[osed to some limitation of executive patronege; but no tangible remody for the evil was proposed. Within a short time, the Democratie Reviow, a leading periodical of that party, has come out in favor of the true reinedy - the aboJUion of the. Executive Patronage, as far as possible, by placing the appointment of officers in the hands ofthe people. This proposition is favorably received by the Letter porlion of that party, and will enlist their support. A large shareof the Whigs, and the whole of the Liberty party, will concur in its support. In ourown State, it is sanctioned by resolutions of the Whig and Democratie State Conventions, and by the declaration of their candidates for Governor, that it will receive their personal nnd official approval. As the principie is thus comng up for general ratification, it may be veil to consider how far it can be possibly carried out in practice. Leaving the consideration of National offices to another accasion, we will examine for a moment, the circumstances of our own State. The number of appointments to office will vary in each State according to its population, wealth, and business. The number of offices filled by the Governor of New York is said to be 2,000 or more;while in our State, although equally large in size, it is much less. But it is worthy of remark, that it is the Governor - only one man - who really appoints all this army to office. True, the law says it shall be done with "the advice and consent of the Senate." But their office is only negative. Tho Senate may rejectan unworthy nomineo, but it cannol sulstitute a worthy one in his -place. - Thus, ii the Senate reject A, the Govern or may then nomínate B, and afterwards C, and D, and so on through the alphabet, and some of these the Senate must confirm, although no more worthy than the person first nominated. If ihey ad journ without doing this, the Governo ban filPthe vacancy till the next session with the verv nerson the Senate has rejected. Thus the nominaling power is truly a one vían power. It is, in fact al most palpable relie of monarchy. ín Michigan, tho State Treasurer is elected by the Legislalure, but most of the other office rs are nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. Among them are The Secretary of Slate, Auditor General, Attorney General, Chancellor, Superintendent of Public lustruction. 4 Supreme Judges, Masters in Chancery, one or more in eachcounty. say 150 in all. 33 Prosecuting Attorneys, one to eachcounty, Notaries Public, n 33 counties, say 300, 12 Regents of University, Commissioncr of 1 nternal Improvement, Do of Land Office. The Revised Stntules made provisión lor appoinlment by the Governor and Sennteofone hundredandninety ihree Inspectora of Provisions and Manufactures, who should nppoint an equal number of deputics, and subordiuates in each town. But how many of these are now appointed wo do not know. It is to be remetnbered that a very large rmmher of subordinates are in the employ of these Staie ofiicers or are appointed hy them. Thus ihe chancellor appoints rfgister?, receivers, sergeants, and other persons in every part of the State. On the Public VVorki are found a vast numbor of cferks, weighmasters, engineers,firemon, repairers, trackwalkers, laboréis, mechanics, contractors, &c, all of whose interests are more or less connected with tho Commissioner who has charge of ihe works. If, then, the number of persons directly appointcd to office be set down at 500, the nurnber of their subordínales cannot be less thnn 1000 more. Add to these several hundred military officers, commissioned by the Governor, and we have an army of nearly or quite 1500 persons, all dependent for their honor or emolumenta, to a greater or less extent, on the Wil] of the Governor of the State, and most of ihem having therefore a private and personal interest in his election. We do not pretend that all these ofïïcers should be elected by the people. - The whole Chancery system, wilh ils 150 officers, should be entirely abolished. The Public Works should be disposed of and then the numerous individuals in the employ of the State would return to their private employments. In refcrenca tohe election ofJudg?s, we shall soy somehing hereafter. But the Secretary of state, State Treasurer, Auditor General, ttorney General, Superintendent of Pubic Instruction, and Commissioner of the Land oflíce ought to be olected by Ihe eople of the whole State, while the Prosecuting Attornies should be elected n their respective counties. lnspectors :f Provisionsand Mnnu factures, if any are needetl, can be elected in every town. As many Notaries Public as ar? needed should be elected every year by each town. The oppointment of the University Regents, and a few similar officers, in our opinión, would be better vested in both branches of the Legislature t han in the Governor. Ilaving thus given a list of he appointmenls of the Governor, we will add a few Ueasons fob. tuk Election op these 0fFICER8. 1. The offices are nove bestowed as a matter of favoritism. Where there nre several applicnnts for an office, the Governor must prefer some to others, and in most cases the ground of preference will be some personal or local considenUions, rather thrn the capaoity, fidelity, and probity of the candidates. 2. The appointing power cannot judge of thequalificationsof the candidates as well as the people. What does the Governer know of the hundreds of Notary Publics that he appoints? Of the 33 Prosecuting Attorneys, he can know but very few of them personally, whereas they will be well known to the people of their respective counties. Henee we conclude that were the offices filled by election rather than by appointment, the incumbents would havebetter qualifications than theyusually posess. 3. The selection of these officers by the people would add to the interest of the elections. 4. It is the interest of subordinntes to nterfere and use their influence for the reappointment or conlinuancc in office of those on whom their own employment depends, however corrupt or unqualified they may be. 5. In mnking appointments, the Governor and Senate will be inclinedto make them from their own class in life. Ifthe associates and acquaintances of the Governor be of the highest class, he will probably nomínate from them in preference to olhers, however deserving, and for the same reason the Senate will be d isposed to confirm them. Were all offices iilled by appointment of the Governor and Senate, the whole country would be governed by a priviledged class, vvho would be a complete aristocracy. - Whereas the people are usnnlly quiteimpartía], and often elect f rom the lowest class in life to the highest official situations. G. Offices nre often bestowed as partisan príze money - as aeward for personal services, past or prospective. Look at a prticular instance. An ambitious and scheming politician is determined to become Govcrnor. He applies himself to his friends in all parts of the State, and says to one, 'Help me, and you shall be Secretary of State" - to nnother. "Help me, and you shall be Superintendent of public Instruclion" - or Auditor General. And in each county one or more of the most worthless and useless of the lawyers can be bought up with theexpectation of being made l'rosecuting Attorney, or Mnsier in Chancery, while a man wlio is a strenuous opponent cannot hope for anything at nll. These individuáis commence electioneering for iheir candidate, nnd make promises of political favors to their subordinates, and private individuals, who are thereby induced to take an active part in favor of that candidate whose election will bnng them advantoge. In this way the prizes are all labored for jointly and distribu ted afterwardsamong the victors. 7. Theappointment of oificers is made an engine of party supremacy and corruption. lt has become an established political maxim that all vacancies in office shouldbe filled by persons of the Jominant party. In this way one half of the talented and deserving men of community are excluded fromall participation in the government. Not only so, but persons actually in office ared for the purpose of making vacancies o be filled by favorites. 8. The effect is bad on thoso who receive office. Every person ought to be manly nnd independent in ex pressing bis views of public men and measures. But he hundreds of persons who nre now ïolding oflicial appoinlments from the Governor cannot be expected to censure strongly thö acts of that individual who ïas graciously presented thein with a ong-expected office. Neither will the thousand persons who are expeclivg office orempíoy through the Executive be at all forward to find fault with him on whom all their hopes depend. Add to these a third class who have received office from the Governor, nnd whose terrfl hasexpired, nnd you have alarge nrmy oftalented and iniluential men whose inlerestsand feelings prompt llicm to support the Executive and the party in pow er, whether their acts rerider them wor thy of support or not. The possession or expectation of ofii ce, on the unprinciplcd, operates as a hribe, while on the ( rood man, t may make himsilent where , lus duty requires him to rebuke loudly j and earuestly. The natural effect of of appointments is to make the receiver conform his actions to the wishes of his patrón. 9. The effect is bad upon the people. Where they have elected a man to office, those who voted forand against him are inclined to scrutinise his course with rigor, because they wish to see if he was or was not worthy of their votes. - Whereasthe people have comparativel'y little interest in the doings of an officer not appointea by themselves. 10. OfKcers appointed by the Executive feel far less responsibilily to the people than they would if elected by them; and are therefore less careful of their interests, and less fearful of their censure. 11. Offices are sometunes bartered away. BsaystoA, his inferior, if you will help me to attain C's situation, mine will be vacant, and I will help get it for you. There isa vast amöunt of intrigue of this kind going on among the holders andseekers of those offices which are filled by the Executive, in all their gradations, from the lowest subordinates to the Cliancellor who sits, like a monarch, in his solitary grandeur. These reasons are amply suflicient to induce us to go for the electon of these State officersby the people. The general favor with which the proposition has already been received by the mass of all parties is to us an indication of tsppeedy adoption by the people Such a reform in State offices will prepare the way for a similar and still more important one in the national government. Of the nature, necessity, and magnitude of this national reform we intend to sa y something hereaftef.